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Article 
Uncoupling the Constitutional Right to  
Self-Defense from the Second Amendment:  
Insights from the Law of War 
WILLIAM G. MERKEL 
This Article contextualizes Professor Nicholas Johnson’s argument that a 
robust right to arms is essential to the security of Black communities in the United 
States.  While accepting Johnson’s premise that private self-defense is necessary 
where government is hostile towards or unable to defend a community against 
violence, this Article maintains that the Second Amendment as understood at the 
time of its ratification did not extend to private self-defense.  Rather than force-
fitting a private right to self-defense into the syntactically and contextually 
unrelated Second Amendment as one-Justice majorities have done in District of 
Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Author suggests that 
honest intellectual engagement with moral and philosophical claims in favor of a 
private right to self-defense could profit enormously from careful consideration of 
the jus ad bellum, the branch of public international law concerning the right of 
states to defend themselves against armed attack.  The lack of an absolute textual 
command in the Constitution, federalism, and deference to democratically 
legitimate legislative policy making favor judicial accommodation of public safety 
and arms control concerns alongside private claims of self-defense.  Comparing 
the right to self-defense in domestic law (as illustrated by the Trayvon Martin 
case) to the right to self-defense in public international law (as illustrated by the 
arguments advanced by the Bush and Obama Administrations to justify the use of 
unmanned drones to target Al Qaeda operatives) suggests that claims to use force 
in self-defense must be limited to situations in which an actual attack is underway 
or imminent.  The Author concludes by suggesting that these limits are inherent in 
general principles of law basic to the very nature of self-defense, and that 
constitutional jurisprudence in the United States would benefit greatly from 
attending to these general principles of law and abandoning historically 
implausible and disingenuous originalism when assessing claims premised on the 
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Uncoupling the Constitutional Right to  
Self-Defense from the Second Amendment:  
Insights from the Law of War 
WILLIAM G. MERKEL∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is a long-established axiom among political theorists that when 
people leave the state of nature and enter into civil society, they accept the 
enforcement of limitations against some of their rights so as to protect and 
indeed maximize other personal and collective rights—including the right 
to security—to the greatest extent possible.1  In modern constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law.  J.D., J.S.D., Columbia University; D. 
Phil. (history), Oxford University.  Special thanks to my excellent student research assistants Madison 
Hamile and Whitney Wilder and to Lisa Smith-Butler, Melissa Strickland and the wonderful Library 
staff at the Charleston School of Law.  Professors Pat Hubbard of the University of South Carolina 
School of Law and Dino Kritsiotis of the University of Nottingham offered cogent reflections and 
critique of earlier versions of this paper.  My J.S.D. examiners at Columbia Law School, Professors 
Mike Dorf, Robert Ferguson, Jamaal Greene, and particularly Committee Chair Professor George 
Fletcher, asked probing and insightful questions during the defense of my dissertation, which included 
substantial sections of this Article.  I am deeply grateful to them for helping me to tighten my 
argument.     
1 This proposition was central to the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
William Blackstone, three of the English-speaking world’s foundational thinkers on governmental 
legitimacy.  Thus, in endeavoring to convince his readers to accept the authority of the English 
Commonwealth after the execution of Charles I, Hobbes wrote:  
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour 
peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as 
far-forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay 
down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other 
men, as he would allow other men against himself.  For as long as every man 
holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition 
of war.  But if other men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no 
reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, 
(which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1651). 
According to John Locke’s Two Treatises of Civil Government, written either to encourage 
overthrow of the government of James II in the early 1680s or to justify the newly established 
constitutional settlement after the Glorious Revolution in 1689,   
[w]herever, therefore, any number of men are so united into one society as to quit 
every one his executive power of the law of nature and to resign it to the public, 
there and there only is a political or civil society.  And this is done wherever any 
number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one 
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democracies, it is generally accepted also that legislatures may legitimately 
                                                                                                                          
body politic, under one supreme government, or else when any one joins himself to, 
and incorporates with, any government already made; for hereby he authorizes the 
society or, which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him as the 
public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance, 
as to his own degrees, is due.  And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of 
a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the 
controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the 
commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it.  And 
wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such 
decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.  
Id. at 164.  In a later passage in the Second Treatise, Locke elaborates:  
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his 
own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will 
he part with his freedom, why will he give up his empire and subject himself to the 
dominion and control of any other power?  To which it is obvious to answer that 
though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very 
uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as 
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity 
and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very 
unsecure.  This makes him willing to quit a condition which, however free, is full of 
fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is 
willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite, 
for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the 
general name "property."  
Id. at 184.  Blackstone, writing to celebrate the firmly established constitutional order of the 1760s 
some seven decades after its foundations in the Glorious Revolution, observed: 
[E]very man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the 
price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of 
mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community 
has thought proper to establish.  And this species of legal obedience and conformity 
is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to 
obtain it. . . . For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute 
and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases: the consequence of which is, 
that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no 
security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125. 
The contextual background to Leviathan is explored by Quentin Skinner in his book Hobbes and 
Republican Liberty.  QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY 178–82, 198–208 (2008).  
Richard Ashcraft follows Peter Laslett in arguing (entirely persuasively in my view) that John Locke’s 
Two Treatises on Government were written as a radical revolutionary and regicidal manifesto during 
the early 1680s rather than as an after-the-fact justification for the Glorious Revolution as earlier 
generations of scholars had assumed.  Laslett dates the writing to the final stages of the Exclusion 
Crisis (ca. 1680–81), while Ashcraft situates the drafting nearer in time to the Rye House Plot of 1683. 
RICHARD ASCHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
(1986).  Stanley Katz’s insightful introductory essay to the Chicago editions of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries explains that Blackstone’s sections on constitutional law and governmental legitimacy 
delicately balanced his perceived need to immunize the existing constitutional arrangement against any 
potential revolutionary challenge, notwithstanding that order’s own revolutionary origins in 1688–
1689.  Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at x–xii (Univ. Chi. 
Press 1979) (1765).  
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adjust the balance among these rights to enforce popular preferences about 
the rights packages deemed most desirable by the citizenry.2  In a society 
in which courts enforce certain rights against legislative judgments, 
legislatures are of course limited in their capacity to adjust rights and 
balance them against other rights.3  Some rights, like the right against 
arbitrary deprivation of life by the state, are almost entirely beyond 
legislative discretion.  The legislature may infringe upon them only in very 
limited circumstances, in the case of the right to life, probably only for the 
purposes of facilitating self-defense and defense of the society, and, in 
societies with legal orders that tolerate execution under the law, carrying 
out capital punishment pursuant to a lawful death sentence.4  Other less 
                                                                                                                          
2 See Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 41 
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994); IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 8–
11 (2d ed. 2000); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1309 (2001). 
3 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 118–22 (1990) (describing the rise during the 
twentieth century of judicial enforcement of individual rights expressed or rooted in the Constitution 
and concomitant tensions between enforcement of legislative preferences and judicial enforcement of 
constitutional values).  Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) and CA 6821/93 Bank 
Mizrahi v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 222, 224 [1995] (Isr.), two foundational cases 
justifying judicial review of legislative acts for conformity with the United States Constitution and the 
Israeli Basic Laws, respectively.  Chief Justice Marshall relied essentially on compact theory to hold 
that the sovereign will of the people in ratifying the Constitution trumps the will of the People’s elected 
agents reduced to statutory law, while Chief Justice Barak held that Basic Laws passed by the Knesset 
in its constitutive as distinct from legislative capacity have constitutional status that renders the Basic 
Laws superior to ordinary statutory law.  On the tension between popular democracy and judicial 
policing of constitutional sovereignty, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST, at vii (1980); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 
155–58 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1949); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 32–38 (2000); MARK TUSHNET: WEAK COURTS, STRONG 
RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 
ix, 3–43 (2008). 
4 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VIII, XIV (Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eight Amendment, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments).  These amendments have spawned an enormous body of constitutional 
jurisprudence on the death penalty.  See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).  In the European context, Article 2 and Protocols Six and 
Thirteen to the European Convention on Human Rights first limited, and then eliminated, the authority 
of governmental actors to impose capital sentences or otherwise deprive persons of life except when 
acting in necessary self-defense, defense of others, or to suppress a riot or insurrection.  European 
Convention on Human Rights art. 2, protocols 6, 13, June 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ 
Convention_ENG.pdf.  The substance of the right is defined in Article 2 of the Convention as follows: 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.  No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
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fundamental rights (consider, for example, the right to operate a motor 
vehicle) are clearly subject to legislative discretion and their restraint is 
frequently permissible, perhaps for purposes such as criminal punishment, 
traffic safety, environmental protection, to preserve public order, to protect 
third parties and allow their indemnification, or to maximize social utility 
pursuant to the legislature’s policy preferences.5  Even staunch libertarians 
generally concede that governmental restraint of liberties that are otherwise 
immune from interference may be permissible to protect third persons from 
harm.6 
In the United States, the question is hotly debated whether gun 
possession and the right to use firearms in self-defense fall closer to the 
fundamental, inalienable end of the spectrum (like the right against 
arbitrary deprivation of life), or nearer to the relativistic, conditional, 
                                                                                                                          
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.   
Id. art. 2. 
5 See generally IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 20–21, 
595−611 (2d ed. 2000) (introducing the study of British Constitutional Law from a comparative 
perspective, contrasting the time-honored Diceyan understanding of unbridled legislative discretion 
with American style judicial review and discussing how the Human Rights Act of 1998 affected the 
British system by subjecting Parliamentary statute-making to fundamental European human rights 
norms).  
6 John Stuart Mill’s famous harm principle holds that personal liberty may not be legitimately 
curtailed by government authority except in situations where an actor’s conduct harms or threatens 
harm to other persons.  In Mill’s original formulation,  
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.  He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right.  These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with 
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
him with any evil in case he do otherwise.  To justify that, the conduct from which it 
is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else.  The 
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others.  In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 
is, of right, absolute.  Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.   
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 8 (Currin V. Shields ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1956) (1859).  By 
referencing preventative self-defense, Mill appears to concede that government may intervene to 
prevent incipient harm, not just to punish wrongdoers after the fact.  Id. 
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legislatively adjustable end of the spectrum (like the right to drive a car).7  
A five-Justice majority on the Supreme Court favors a position nearer to 
the fundamental side.8  Professor Nicholas J. Johnson appears to agree.9  
Or at least, Professor Johnson takes for granted that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect a 
robust personal right to armed self-defense outside the context of service in 
the lawfully established militia represent salubrious developments, in that 
they rule out policy options such as total gun bans that he finds ill-
advised.10 
Johnson’s thoughtful Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An 
Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy marshals an impressive and 
ultimately irrefutable array of evidence to demonstrate that from the end of 
Reconstruction until the later phases of the Civil Rights Movement, 
government in the United States, on the local, state, and national levels, 
consistently failed the Black community by turning a blind eye to, abetting, 
and at times orchestrating racist violence against African Americans, 
thereby supporting or at least tolerating white supremacist cultures 
committed to legal, social, and economic subordination of African 
Americans in both North and South.11  With government having failed the 
Black community in this regard, Johnson proceeds to observe in 
quintessentially Hobbesian fashion that the right of private self-defense 
endures wherever government remains unable or unwilling to protect 
citizens or subjects against private or official violence.12  While this insight 
was freighted with political hazards for Black leaders for much of modern 
American history,13 as a matter of natural law and justice it remains 
unassailable, for to deny otherwise unprotected persons the right to self-
defense in the face of armed attack is to deny their core rights to life and 
dignity.  More unusually and controversially, Johnson suggests that things 
have not necessarily changed materially for the Black community with the 
                                                                                                                          
7 On the heated debate and cultural conflict over the twinned questions of gun rights and gun 
control, see generally SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND 
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 73−106, 137–208 (2006); DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE 
MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 97−220 (2003). 
8 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  Heller recognized a Second Amendment right to keep commonly held weapons 
for purposes of self-defense in the home, and marked the first time the Supreme Court had clearly 
acknowledged a Second Amendment right not connected to service in the lawfully established militia.  
McDonald applied the substantive right described in Heller against state and municipal governments. 
9 See Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the 
Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491 (2013). 
10 See id. at Part V.B.2. 
11 See id. at Part I. 
12 See id. at Part III.B. 
13 See id. at Part II.B. 
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disappearance of Jim Crow, the end of state sponsorship and enablement of 
white supremacists, and the coming of Black political empowerment.14  
Today, many urban Black communities confront constant peril at the hands 
of a criminal subclass of gangsters, drug lords, and violence-prone thugs.15  
The most salient contemporary architects of violence against peaceable 
African Americans then are no longer state actors or state-aided white 
supremacists, but rather urban Black criminals who local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies cannot effectively combat, owing not to lack of 
will, but lack of resources and complex social and economic factors that so 
far have eluded governmental control.16  For Johnson, the source of 
government’s failure to protect African Americans is not outcome-
determinative; when government is unable to protect, the right to private 
self-defense endures, and this holds as true today as it did during the era of 
lynching a century ago.17   
At its heart, Johnson’s article is not about constitutional doctrine or 
constitutional theory.  His is a policy paper.  Johnson’s argument is that 
Black political leaders who have endorsed strict gun control policies since 
the late-1960s should rethink their position and consider embracing John 
Lott’s “more guns, less crime” hypothesis.18  I am much more of a 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at Part III.B. 
15 Id. at Part V.B.1. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. at Part III.B. 
18 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:  UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL 
LAWS 19 (1998).  John Lott is a Fox News personality, famous for his “more guns, less crime” 
hypothesis.  See John Lott Archive, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/archive/author/john-
lott/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).  This is an academically dubious claim, however, that has 
been debunked and discredited by leading authorities in social science and public health.  See, e.g., Ian 
Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis—With 
Some Help from Moody and Marvell, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 35, 56 (2009); Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue 
III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003); 
Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1112 (2001); see also DENNIS A. 
HENIGAN, LETHAL LOGIC: EXPLODING THE MYTHS THAT PARALYZE AMERICAN GUN POLICY 131 
(2009); Tim Lambert, Did Lott Cook His “More Guns, Less Crime” Data?, SCIENCEBLOGS (Apr. 25, 
2003), http://scienceblogs.com/deltoid/2003/04/25/0426/.  Lott used dishonest practices to help make 
More Guns, Less Crime a cause célèbre.  He worked hard to generate positive publicity for the book by 
publishing his own overblown favorable reviews under the assumed name of Mary Rosh.  See Julian 
Sanchez, The Mystery of Mary Rosh: How a New Form of Journalism Investigated a Gun Research 
Riddle, REASON, May 1, 2003, at 16, 18; see also Tim Lambert, Mary Rosh’s Blog, SCIENCEBLOGS, 
(Jan. 21, 2003), http://scienceblogs.com/deltoid/2003/01/21/maryrosh/.  On the most basic level, Lott’s 
central claim that guns reduce the rate of crime defies reality.  Japan and England, with very low rates 
of gun ownership and strict gun control laws, have minuscule murder rates compared to the U.S. with 
its notoriously high rate of gun ownership.  See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORTS (2011), available at  http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-
u.s.-2011/violent-crime/murder; Publication Hub: Gateway to UK National Statistics, U.K. OFF. OF 
NAT’L STATISTICS, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/crime-justice/crime/crime-trends (last visited May 
21, 2013); Intentional Homicide, Number and Rate per 100,000 Population, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=UNODC&f=tableCode%3A1 (last visited May 21, 2013).  New York 
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constitutional historian than a policy wonk, so I will say relatively little 
about the merits vel non of gun control and the Lottian alternative of 
unrestricted access to guns.  For the record, I will disclose that I think 
Lott’s vision is fanciful and absurd, and that I object to it for a variety of 
fundamental reasons.19  I will concede however, as any honest observer 
must, that it resonates with a substantial segment of the American 
population, and that its implementation is eminently permissible as a 
constitutional matter.   There is nothing in the text, structure, or case law of 
the United States Constitution that in any way inhibits local, state, or 
national government from leaving gun possession entirely unregulated.  
But in contrast to Lott, Professor Johnson, and five current Supreme Court 
Justices, I take the position that there is likewise nothing in the text or pre-
2008 case law of the Second Amendment to prohibit local, state, or 
national government from heavily regulating and severely restricting 
access to firearms.20   Whether government should allow access to guns is, 
as I explain below, a matter that the Second Amendment, properly 
construed, leaves entirely to legislative discretion.  That said, I have 
enormous sympathy for Professor Johnson’s core claims regarding the 
fundamental right to self-defense, and the particular importance of that 
                                                                                                                          
City, with what, by U.S. standards, amounts to restrictive firearms regulation, has a significantly lower 
murder rate than South Carolina, a state with lax gun laws and a population wedded to the gun culture.  
See Harry Bradford, 10 Most Violent States in the U.S.: The Institute for Economics and Peace, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/13/10-most-
violent-states_n_848317.html#s263573&title=9_South_Carolina.  This comprehensive data can be 
found in the Institute for Economics & Peace’s 2011 Peace Index study.  INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, 
UNITED STATES PEACE INDEX 4 (2011), available at http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/U.S.-Peace-Index-2011-3.pdf.  Lott and Professor Johnson both repeatedly 
claim that gun control has failed in the District of Columbia, but the murder rate in D.C. has actually 
been falling substantially over the past fifteen years, reaching its lowest level since the early 1960s just 
last year.  See Record-Low Homicides for District, WASH. INFORMER (Jan. 4, 2013, 6:01 PM), 
http://washingtoninformer.com/index.php/local/item/12769-record-low-homicides-for-district (noting 
that Washington, D.C. recorded eighty-eight homicides in 2012, the lowest number of homicides since 
1961, and that this number is significantly lower than the crack-cocaine era when D.C.’s homicide 
reports exceeded 400).  In sum, Lott is a highly dubious authority to depend on when formulating 
public policy on such important concerns as guns and crime.  
19 See supra note 18. 
20 See, e.g., William G. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May 
Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1239–42 
(2010) [hereinafter Merkel, Heller as Hubris] (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support the 
claim that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated incorporation of a 
private right to arms against the states, that Justice Alito’s opinion places far too much stock in the 
dubious historical claims relied on by Justice Scalia in Heller, and that state and municipal gun control 
provisions that do not offend equal protection principles were not considered to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it was ratified); William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin 
Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349, 360–63, 377–78 (2009) 
[hereinafter Merkel, Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism] (arguing that Justice Scalia’s 
allegedly originalist opinion in Heller is historically unsupportable, and that the Second Amendment 
was not originally understood to stand in the way of legislative restrictions on gun use and possession). 
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right to members of vulnerable communities who have long been disserved 
by government.  Honest engagement with constitutional text and 
constitutional jurisprudence, I explain below, suggests strongly that the 
right to self-defense that Professor Johnson favors cannot be rooted in the 
original understanding of the Second Amendment, but that it could 
plausibly and cogently be based on substantive due process, natural law, 
the Ninth Amendment, and fundamental principles of law that emerge 
from comparative inquiry into foreign and international law. 
This Article briefly summarizes the reasons why the Supreme Court’s 
recent Second Amendment jurisprudence is wrong-headed, and then 
outlines several alternative perspectives that may afford greater insight into 
the nature and limits of the right to self-defense than does the originalist 
course embraced by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller21 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago.22  But before turning my attention to 
what I see as obvious errors in the two just-mentioned cases, it will be 
useful to point out how many policy-related questions those decisions have 
left open.  This, in turn, suggests that it remains pivotally important both 
for gun enthusiasts like Professor Johnson and for gun skeptics like me to 
develop a more cogent theoretical understanding of the constitutional 
parameters surrounding armed self-defense than that offered by the Court 
in either Heller or McDonald.      
II.  QUESTIONS LEFT OPEN BY HELLER AND MCDONALD 
The Supreme Court’s recent foray into the arena of armed self-defense 
has, as the well-worn cliché would have it, raised more questions than it 
has answered.  Indeed, while they sound a self-defense-friendly tone, 
Heller and McDonald actually answer very few questions concerning the 
scope of policy options permissible to national, state, and local legislatures 
and administrative bureaus.23  The holding in the two cases is that the 
Constitution protects “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in 
case of confrontation,”24 but that this right is subject to “reasonable . . . 
regulations.”25  The Court’s binding legal instructions, then, are cast in 
very general terms.  We know after Heller and McDonald that neither 
national nor state government may render it all but impossible for an 
individual to keep in the home and have access there to an operational 
handgun of a sort commonly owned by the general public for purposes of 
                                                                                                                          
21 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
22 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
23 Cf. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 705, 709–16 (2012). 
24 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050; Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 
25 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046. 
 2013] UNCOUPLING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE 1819 
 
self-defense.26  We know the same restrictions that apply against national 
legislative authority also apply against the states and municipalities.27  And 
we know that, according to dicta uttered by Justice Scalia in Heller and 
echoed by Justice Alito in McDonald, laws relating to control and 
prohibition of unusual or particularly dangerous weapons, possession of 
weapons by convicted felons or the insane, and access to weapons in 
certain sensitive places such as schools and government buildings are 
presumptively unaffected by the constitutional right to arms.28  But that is 
probably the full extent of our knowledge.  Neither legislators, 
administrators, nor the general public have yet been instructed by the 
Supreme Court as to how the newly-recognized constitutional right to 
armed self-defense impacts laws concerning:  
1. Carrying weapons outside the home; 
2. Carrying weapons inside a vehicle; 
3. Self-defense outside the home or in vehicles; 
4. Limitations on the number of weapons individuals may own; 
5. Waiting periods; 
6. Conditioning gun ownership on psychological evaluation;  
7. Inspections of weapons; 
8. Taxation; 
9. Sport shooting; 
10. Hunting; 
11. Gun collecting; 
12. Licensure; 
13. Registration; 
14. Mandatory safety training; 
15. Restrictions on gun ownership arguably analogous to, but not 
directly within, the categories of presumptively permissible 
regulations listed by Justices Scalia and Alito; or 
16. Weapons related to service in the lawfully-established militia 
(there is some irony on this last point, all the more so in light 
of the once respected rule of United States v. Miller29). 
In the nearly five years since the Heller decision, over one hundred 
                                                                                                                          
26 Id. at 3050; Heller, 554 U.S. at 627, 635. 
27 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. 
28 Id. 3047; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
29 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  Miller was the most important Supreme Court decision on the Second 
Amendment prior to Heller.  Miller was distinguished and not overturned in Heller, but for decades 
constitutionalists and Courts of Appeals had agreed nearly unanimously that Miller restricted the 
Second Amendment right to weapons linked to service in the lawfully established militia.  In Miller, 
Justice McReynolds wrote, “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 
‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second 
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”  Id. at 178. 
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gun-rights-related cases have been docketed or decided in United States 
Courts of Appeals.30  All of the questions listed above and others linking 
Second Amendment-related claims to other constitutional values such as 
freedom of expression31 or freedom from unreasonable search and seizure32 
are now being litigated, and in the absence of particular instructions from 
the Supreme Court, federal and state courts have applied varying standards 
of review ranging from permissive33 to differing iterations of intermediate 
scrutiny.34  So far, however, only one post-Heller federal Court of Appeals 
case has upheld a right to arms-based challenge to government action.  The 
Seventh Circuit has issued a preliminary injunction against the City of 
Chicago, lifting a ban on firing ranges in the City that rendered compliance 
with a hand gun licensing scheme requiring one hour of annual training 
burdensome, thereby vitiating the right to have a handgun to defend the 
home.35  In reaching its decision to enjoin the firing range ban, the Court 
noted that Second Amendment standards are still emerging, making it 
difficult for trial courts to apply the still largely undefined right with 
precision.36  In this light, understanding the theoretical underpinnings of 
the new right acquires considerable practical import.  I would like to 
suggest that, going forward, there must be better alternatives to 
originalism, and especially to theories of originalism premised on patently 
false history. 
A.  The Limits of Originalism 
The original public meaning methodology expounded by the Court in 
                                                                                                                          
30 List on file with Author.  As of August 2012, U.S. Courts of Appeals have decided 101 cases 
involving post-Heller Second Amendment claims.  See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1551, 1565 (2009) (“By January 15, 2009, lower federal courts had decided over seventy-five 
different cases challenging gun control laws under the Second Amendment.”).    
31 See Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting gun rights claim 
premised on expressive conduct doctrine under First Amendment); cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as 
Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1297, 1299–1301 
(2009) (exploring analogies between the Second Amendment right described in Heller and the First 
Amendment protected right to possess obscene materials in the home). 
32 See United States v. Garvin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76540, at *9–10, *12–13  (E.D. Pa. May 
31, 2012). 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 416–17, 421 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) as reasonably related to substantial government interest); United States v. Decastro, 
682 F.3d 160, 164, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that heightened scrutiny is triggered only where a 
regulation substantially burdens the Second Amendment right); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 
1111, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to the Second Amendment rights of 
felons). 
34 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding 
prohibition on convicted felon possession of firearms in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as substantially related to 
an important government interest);  
35 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 690–91, 710–11 (2012). 
36 Id. at 690. 
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Heller and McDonald does not correlate well with the non-militia-linked 
right to armed private self-defense voted into life by a one justice majority 
in each case.37  The substantive right with which the Court was ultimately 
concerned—i.e., the right of individual persons to be armed in anticipation 
of the need to defend themselves against private aggression—was simply 
not discussed, or was discussed only marginally, when the young Republic 
took up the question of ratifying the Amendment.38  Indeed, it is not far off 
the mark to reflect on two unrelated conversations that have little if any 
intersection.  One conversation, spanning the years 1788–1791, concerned 
principally the virtues of the universal militia and the dangers of standing 
armies,39 while a separate conversation, playing itself out in our own time, 
concerns the liberty of individuals to guard against the criminal element.40  
It is more than passing strange that disputants in the second conversation 
should look to the long-gone participants in the first for validation and 
approval.  Perhaps there is even a hint of the tragic-comedic when present 
political actors appeal to past authority, claiming involvement in a 
conversation that logically cannot become real.41  And yet, as Professor 
Jamal Greene trenchantly argues, originalism is all too real to ignore, 
because it has political currency and appeal, and this insures it will to some 
measure shape law in a more or less democratic polity—or at least that it 
will do so as long as its political appeal endures.42 
Originalism may be a false philosophy,43 yet it is anything but 
                                                                                                                          
37 Cf. Winkler, supra note 30, at 1557–58, 1564 (noting that, even though it has been hailed by 
some as a triumph of originalism, the Heller decision actually rests on current popular understanding of 
the right to arms, and suggesting that this logical inconsistency actually strengthens the opinion by 
making it more relevant and more likely to endure). 
38 I discuss this in my two previously cited articles.  See Merkel, Heller as Hubris, supra note 20, 
at 1226; Merkel, Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 20, at 352–53; see also 
Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism in a Digital Age: An Inquiry into the Right to Bear Arms, 29 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 585, 586–87 (2009) (detailing the results of systematic reviews of digitized records 
of pamphlets, journals, books, and legislative records of the late colonial and founding eras indicating 
that 95% or more of preserved uses of “bear arms” and its cognates refer unambiguously to militia or 
army service and not carrying weapons for private purposes).     
39 See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, 
HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 93 (2002). 
40 See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 116 (2006). 
41 For a series of essays on originalism as comedy and farce, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & 
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
42 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 659–60 (2009). 
43 There has been extensive academic writing regarding the dubious historical pretensions of the 
original public meaning school of originalism.  See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. 
The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 295 (2011); Martin Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 590 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal 
Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934–35 (1996).  Another litany 
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impotent.  The tragedy of originalism, then, is of a different nature than 
Belshazzar’s appeal to gods of wood and iron or Canute’s imploring 
Wotan to command the North Sea to stand still.  For a false god, 
originalism has a lot of clout.  That power, though, has its limits.  As 
deployed in contemporary constitutional politics, originalist methodology 
is more concerned about dressing up and justifying intuitions than offering 
enlightenment or informing normative vision.44  Not that “conversation” 
with the past need be a corrupt enterprise.  Efforts to “read,” “discover,” 
“dis-cover,” “uncover,” “deconstruct,” “reconstruct,” or “enter” the 
founding era past have yielded rich enlightenment in the textual 
explorations of many non-originalist historians of the constitutional era.45  
To be meaningful and transformative, however, excursions into bygone 
worlds require modesty, effort, study, and perspective if they are not to end 
up bogged down in the banal and narcissistic projections of presentist 
voyeurs.  There is a world of difference between the careful reconstructive 
architectonics of, say, Eric Slauter’s The State as a Work of Art,46 in which 
now dead metaphors reanimate as powerful leitmotifs, and Heller, in which 
cultural raiders swiftly pillage the past for usable artifacts whose 
significance they cannot accurately explain.47  
B.  The Limits of Ancestor Worship 
Apart from the problem of indeterminacy that bedevils original public 
meaning and original intent-based originalism alike, and the susceptibility 
of historical evidence to manipulation by advocates and results-oriented 
judges, and apart from normative questions associated with the dead hand 
of the democratically deficient past,48 there remain telling prudential 
reasons not to adhere slavishly to policy preferences of bygone days, even 
when clever jurists manage to articulate avowedly “neutral reasons” for 
                                                                                                                          
of scholarly writings addresses the shortcomings of original intent-based model of originalism that has 
largely been supplanted by the original public meaning school.  See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205 (1980); Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael 
C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1107 (1990); Mark 
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781, 824 (1983). 
44 See Merkel, Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 20, at 352. 
45 See, e.g., ROBERT A. FERGUSON, READING THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2004); JAY FLIEGELMAN, 
DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, AND THE CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 
(1993); PETER S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD (2000). 
46 ERIC SLAUTER, THE STATE AS A WORK OF ART: THE CULTURAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
47 See Merkel, Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 20, at 352.  The image 
of “standard model” Second Amendment enthusiasts as historical raiders is developed with telling 
acumen in Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest State of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 103 (2000). 
48 For more on these ills, see generally FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 41. 
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doing just that.  At the risk of indelicacy, salient prudence-based reasons 
for shunning past practice focus on the problem that, for those who accept 
the existence or even the possibility of human progress, the United States 
in which the Constitution was framed was infinitely more barbarous than 
the United States of today.49  As Jefferson reflected nearly two hundred 
years ago,  
I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried 
changes in laws and constitutions. . . . But I know also, that 
laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress 
of the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change 
of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep 
pace with the times.  We might as well require a man to wear 
still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society 
to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous 
ancestors.50  
Jefferson appears to have contemplated less rigid adherence to the frozen 
norms of yesteryear than Justice Scalia had in mind in Heller.  Of course, 
Justice Scalia’s adherence to ancient values allegedly written into 
constitutional text is—at least nominally—conditional.  As he wrote in his 
United States v. Virginia51 dissent, “to counterbalance the Court’s criticism 
of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us free to 
change.”52  But the claim that norms discovered in two hundred year-old 
constitutional text are immune to charges associated with the dead hand of 
                                                                                                                          
49 To contextualize the founding generation’s fascination with barbarism, modernity, and human 
progress, consider J.G.A. Pocock’s analysis and situation of Edward Gibbon’s 1776 work, Decline and 
Fall of the Roman Empire.  J.G.A. POCOCK, 5 BARBARISM AND RELIGION 386 (2010). 
50 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 32, 40–41 (Albert Ellery Berch ed., 1905).  This quotation is displayed on the 
Southeast Portico at the Jefferson Memorial in Washington D.C.  About the Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial, NAT’L PARK SERV., www.nps.gov/thje/historyculture/about-the-memorial.htm+&cd= 
1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited Mar. 24, 2013, 8:30 PM).  As the letter to Kercheval suggests, 
Jefferson’s characteristically enlightened faith in human progress endured well into the Age of 
Romanticism.  Consider also the following admonition against unthinking devotion to the ways of the 
past:  
When I contemplate the immense advances in science and discoveries in the arts 
which have been made within the period of my life, I look forward with confidence 
to equal advances by the present generation, and have no doubt they will 
consequently be as much wiser than we have been as we than our fathers were, and 
they than the burners of witches.   
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (Mar. 3, 1818), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 162, 164–65 (Albert Ellery Berch ed., 1905).   
51 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
52 Id. at 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the past because they are subject to alteration by the amendment process is 
quite problematic.  Writing that our fictive ancestors left “us” free to 
change presupposes that they had a capacity to bind “us” in the first place, 
and that they might legitimately bind us not only to norms but also to 
onerous procedures required to surmount those norms’ deep entrenchment.  
Jefferson’s remarks on the dubiousness of authority from barbarous times 
thus adumbrate a larger problem about originalism: The founders’ intent 
about intent is anything but clear.53  An original public meaning-oriented 
originalist might glibly retort that intent is irrelevant (because the public 
meaning originalist says only original public meaning matters).  Whatever 
the relevance of intent to modern constitutional understanding, it is not 
clear that the ratifying generation was any less skeptical about the 
normative capacity of their language to bind a future body politic in 
perpetuity than Jefferson was about the desirability of his generation 
imposing its political preferences on those not yet born.    
III.  FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM 
Considerations of federalism and democratic experimentalism also 
caution against mapping out a future dependent on alleged original public 
understanding of a private right to arms.54  In a federal system like that of 
the United States, with numerous jurisdictions with substantial legislative 
authority, the best way to maximize the happiness of the largest number of 
persons may well be to allow local legislatures to experiment in the fashion 
suggested by Louis Brandeis55 and offer residents different packages of 
immunities, obligations, government services, and taxes. Those who 
cherish guns will naturally gravitate towards gun friendly jurisdictions, 
while those who believe public safety is better served by gun control will 
gravitate towards jurisdictions with substantial restrictions on gun 
ownership.56 
                                                                                                                          
53 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 948 (1985). 
54 On democratic experimentalism, see generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 269 (1998). 
55 “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
56 Pat Hubbard, my colleague at the University of South Carolina School of Law, has suggested a 
potentially serious reservation against the democratic experimentalism based argument that freedom of 
movement allows those who object to majority preferences to “vote with their feet” and move to 
another jurisdiction where majority preferences mirror their own.  For Professor Hubbard, this 
argument is uncomfortably similar to the intolerant refrain of patriots during the era of the Vietnam 
War, who embraced the mantra “America: love it or leave it,” and urged those who objected to the war 
to forsake their citizenship on grounds of ideological impurity.  As Hubbard explains, leaving one’s 
home is entirely too high a price to pay for the privilege of favoring policies not endorsed by the 
 
 2013] UNCOUPLING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE 1825 
 
My preferred option rests on two premises.  First, the Supreme Court’s 
view that the Constitution’s text mandates a strong right to guns even 
outside the context of service in the lawfully established militia is not (as 
Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas insist it is) dictated by the original 
public meaning of the constitutional text when it was ratified.  In fact, as I 
have argued previously,57 the original public meaning of the Second 
Amendment did not extend to arms possession outside the context of 
militia service at all, and according to the careful quantitative research of 
historian Nathan Kozuskanich, well over 95% of uses of the phrase “bear 
arms” and its cognates surviving in pamphlets, journals, books, and 
recorded legislative debates in late colonial British North America and the 
early Republic unambiguously refer to militia service or military duty.58  
Second, contra to many strong libertarians, I do not assume that Pareto 
optimality is the touchstone of all legitimate government action.  
According to Pareto, no government action is justified that leaves any 
single person worse off than he or she was before the government 
intervention.59  Thus, redistributive taxes would be illegitimate because 
many wealthy persons object to paying higher taxes than poor persons.  
Pareto optimality is, however, too harsh of a standard.  In fact, it is an 
injunction against virtually all governmental action.  To take an extreme 
example, the Thirteenth Amendment is not Pareto optimal because some 
                                                                                                                          
majority of voters in the jurisdiction.  I counter that minority or officious individual veto of majority-
favored policies is not without enormous social and utilitarian costs in its own right.  When Officer 
Heller won his case, the results were hardly Pareto neutral, or even Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  The 
majority of District of Columbia residents was not rendered more happy and content by the decision, 
and arguably public safety (or at least the majority-favored policy respecting public safety) was 
adversely impacted, as well.  
Perhaps the most extreme variant of the “voting with your feet” modality of democratic 
experimentalism is that espoused by the radical U.S. expatriate academic Jonathon Moses, who argues 
that freedom of migration across international borders will maximize civic contentment allowing all of 
humanity to participate in a global market for packages of government policies, services, and 
protections.  JONATHAN W. MOSES, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: GLOBALISM’S LAST FRONTIER 
(2006).  I applaud Moses for being willing to pursue the principles to which he adheres to their ultimate 
limits.  But when I heard him make the case for open borders at a plenary session of the European 
Association of American Studies Conference at the University of Oslo in 2008, the overwhelming 
sense among Northern hemisphere academics and policy makers attending seemed to be that the severe 
free rider problems associated with immigrants seeking out advantageous benefit plans that they had 
not helped finance through a lifetime of taxation would doom a worldwide open borders strategy to the 
same sort of “race to the bottom” difficulties that vexed the United States in the early twentieth century, 
prior to the establishment of the modern American regulatory state during the New Deal.  My more 
modest argument respecting the Second Amendment does not concern social and economic rights that 
require financing by means of onerous taxes.  Unlike Moses’s scheme, offering U.S. citizens different 
packages of gun rights and restrictions in different jurisdictions is unlikely to lead to chaos and free-
riding.  
57 See Merkel, Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, supra note 20; Merkel, Heller as 
Hubris, supra note 20. 
58 Kozuskanich, supra note 38, at 585–87. 
59 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (8th ed. 2011). 
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plantation owners were unhappy after abolition of slavery.  Unlike strict 
disciples of Pareto, my general sense is that majority preferences can, in 
many instances, be legitimately enforced against a dissenting minority.  
Federalism and Brandeisian experimentalism provide one safeguard 
against majority abuses.  After all, when it comes to guns, we can be fairly 
confident that a great many states will opt for permissive rules in the 
foreseeable future.  Many people (including, of course, Justices Scalia, 
Alito, and Thomas) believe that judicial enforcement of the Second 
Amendment provides another essential security.  I read the text of the 
Constitution differently and I am convinced that most individuals would 
have shared my view when the text was enacted and ratified. 
The alleged plain meaning and original public understanding of 
constitutional text are not the only plausible claims in favor of allowing 
what Alexander Bickel called counter-majoritarian intervention by the 
judiciary.60  Before the rise of originalism, public choice theory as reflected 
in the work of John Hart Ely61 and still more famously in Carolene 
Products Footnote Four62 set out three criteria under which the normal 
default rule protecting legislative preferences against judicial intervention 
might yield.  The first paragraph of then Justice Stone’s famous footnote 
invoked express prohibitions in constitutional text; the second paragraph 
spoke of unworkable impasses in the political process created by the 
corrupting influence of entrenched and unyielding power; and the third 
paragraph, most famous of all, described the special case of “discreet and 
insular minorities” who might be targets of deliberate majority abuse.63  If I 
am right about the text of the Second Amendment, the judicially created 
right to arms clearly falls outside paragraph one of Carolene Products 
Footnote Four, because the text concerns only arms bearing in the militia.  
I am very much inclined to think that paragraph two of Footnote Four is 
likewise inadmissible as a special claim for judicial intervention on behalf 
of gun rights because, if anything, gun advocates have succeeded in 
rigging the local, state, and national political processes against gun control 
legislation.64  Paragraph three may have some purchase on the local level 
in cosmopolitan urban settings, but it is by no means clear to me that 
officious intermeddlers from Montana or Alabama should enjoy veto 
power by judicial proxy over the decisions of elected legislatures in New 
                                                                                                                          
60 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 16–19 (1962). 
61 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36, 181 
(1980). 
62 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
63 Id.  
64 See, e.g., James V. Grimadli, Focused NRA a Force in U.S. Politics, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 
2010, at A10 (one installment in a long series of pieces by Grimadli exploring the profound influence 
of the NRA in Washington).  
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York City or Chicago.65  When it comes to gun rights on the national 
plane, the third paragraph seems wholly inapplicable; seeing as gun 
enthusiasts are probably not a minority at all, they are certainly not discreet 
and insular, and thanks to Brandeisian experimentalism, they are always 
free to leave San Francisco or D.C. for more congenial climes. 
Another migration-related consideration (this one invoking Jonathan 
Moses’s global variation of Brandeisian experimentalism66) gives me 
pause respecting the Supreme Court’s recent fabrication of a private right 
to weapons possession and its incorporation against the states.  As far as I 
know, a right to weapons possession is not considered fundamental in any 
legal system outside the United States.  I do not know of any international 
human rights instrument or any constitution in another society with a well-
developed system of justice that protects a right to guns.  This causes me to 
wonder whether the right in question is really fundamental in character.  
Perhaps it is merely an American idiosyncrasy.  That said, the right to self-
defense, particularly the right to self-defense in contexts where government 
cannot or does not protect individuals claiming the right, is acknowledged 
around the world.67  This realization likewise causes me to think that it 
might be more sensible to discuss self-defense on its own merits even in 
our own country, rather than treat it as a legacy of constitutional language 
addressed to a militia system the nation abandoned long ago.68 
IV.  INSIGHTS FROM THE LAW OF WAR 
I have argued that originalism offers inadequate normative guidance 
respecting the meaning of the right to self-defense in contemporary 
                                                                                                                          
65 The problematic character of single person veto over policies favored by the majority is 
illustrated most poignantly in the case of eighteenth century Poland, where every aristocrat in the 
numerous hereditary upper house enjoyed the “liberum veto” (i.e., the capacity to block policy favored 
by the majority in both houses and the executive).  See Paul Krugman, The Senate Becomes a Polish 
Joke, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/the-
senate-becomes-a-polish-joke/.  This rendered Poland incapable of responding to foreign aggression, 
leading ultimately to the state’s partition, annexation, and disappearance.  Id.; see also, NORMAN 
DAVIES, 1 GOD’S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 11 (1982) (leading English language study of 
eighteenth century Polish political history). 
66 See MOSES, supra note 56, at 200. 
67 In public international law, serious comparative reflection on the nature of self-defense in 
different municipal legal systems goes back at least to the time of the Suez Crisis, when D.W. Bowett 
developed the claim that an international legal right to (collective) self-defense (including anticipatory 
self-defense) was inherent in the general principles of international law because a municipal analogue 
existed in legal systems around the world.  See D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3–4 (1958) (expanding arguments first set out in the British Year Book of International Law in 
1955–1956). 
68 See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 39, at 109–10, 166–67 (tracing the disappearance, over the 
course of the nineteenth century, of the universal compulsory militia envisioned at the time the 
Constitution was ratified and outlining the argument that the Second Amendment right to arms cannot 
coherently be applied given the collapse of the predicate by which that right was textually conditioned). 
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American law in large part because there is little substantive overlap 
between the founding era conversation respecting the meaning of the 
Second Amendment and current debates concerning the right to self-
defense.  There is, however, a very substantial body of contemporary legal 
discourse that yields rich insights, attracts powerful contributions from 
around the world, and overlaps in substance to a very large degree with 
contemporary American concerns regarding self-defense as a fundamental 
right under municipal law.  This body of law is jus ad bellum, the 
international law governing the initial application of force that may or may 
not engender armed conflict.69 
As long ago as the Caroline Dispute of 1837–1842, which involved 
British use of force against a ship used by American soldiers of fortune to 
assist insurgents in Canada, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster and 
British Minster to the United States Lord Ashburton were able to agree on 
the basic analytic outlines of justified self-defense in international law.70  
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has added 
precision and gloss (and at times, some confusion) to the legal regime 
explaining when defensive force is justified.  A state’s lawful resort to 
defensive force must target an actual armed attack, and that attack must 
rise to the level of being “significant.”71  Whether the use of defensive 
force against an imminent but not yet executed attack is legal is hotly 
debated;72 the Bush Doctrine purporting to justify the use of force against 
mere potential (but not imminent) threats has been almost universally 
                                                                                                                          
69 The municipal analogy, exploring self-defense under the law of armed conflict and self-defense 
in municipal law under to the same principles of analytic jurisprudence has been powerfully developed.  
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS 
JUSTIFIED AND WHY 216–17 (2008); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 161, 333 (2007).. 
70 John E. Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in JOHN E. NOYES 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 263, 263 (2007). 
71 But cf. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 5 (Dec. 15) (holding the U.K.’s use of naval 
force to clear mines unlawful since the deployment did not serve the purpose of defending against an 
armed attack); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 
4, 124–25 (June 27) (holding that Nicaragua’s sending of assistance to Salvadoran rebels in the form of 
weapons and logistical support was not a significant armed attack justifying the use of defense force by 
the intervening United States). 
72 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 357–61 (2d ed. 2005).  The International Court 
of Justice has never expressly endorsed anticipatory self-defense, but state practice and publicists go 
both ways.  I find a terminological distinction between anticipatory self-defense against an imminent 
attack (consider Lord Ashburton’s formulation of instant and overwhelming necessity or the situation 
of Israel in 1967 when combined Egyptian/Syrian armies massed on the borders and President Nasser 
announced his intention to destroy Israel) and preemptive self-defense (consider the Bush Doctrine 
purporting to justify strikes against potential threats) cogent and useful.  State practice suggests that at 
least some acts of anticipatory self-defense are not viewed as illegal; in contrast, no authorities outside 
the United States have endorsed Bush Doctrine-style preemptive self-defense.  See W. Michael 
Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 525 (2006). 
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repudiated.73  The ICJ itself has never embraced the right to defend against 
anything other than an actual attack.  To act lawfully, the defending state 
must use force against the party responsible for the attack.74  Finally and 
crucially, the defending state’s use of force must be necessary to repulse an 
actual attack, and it must be proportional in the sense of not exceeding the 
level of force required to effectively defend against that attack.75 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the U.N., and its opinions on 
the use of force draw heavily on two specific provisions of the U.N. 
Charter, Article 2(4) prohibiting “the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and Article 
51 preserving “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs.”76  However, there is nothing in the ICJ’s 
jurisprudence to suggest that the normative content of the law of self-
defense depends primarily on the Charter text.  In fact, the Nicaragua Case, 
perhaps the ICJ’s most important decision on the use of force and the 
scope of lawful (collective) self-defense, relied on customary international 
law, not the U.N. Charter.77  It is fair to say then that the ICJ’s 
                                                                                                                          
73 Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 72, at 530–32, 547–48. 
74 See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 190–92 (Nov. 6) (holding U.S. strikes on 
Iranian oil platforms unlawful where it was unclear whether prior attacks were carried out by Iranian or 
Iraqi forces); Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 4, 6 (July 9).  The controversial advisory opinion on the Wall has been 
read by some commentators including Professors George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin to permit the use of 
defensive force only against attacks by states, but if this is what the International Court of Justice 
intended, the opinion in the Wall case is inconsistent with prior opinions (Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities) and reason.  FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 69, at 5–6, 146.  Professor 
Mary Ellen O’Connell argues that the advisory opinion only speaks to the legitimate use of defensive 
force under the U.N. Charter, holding out the possibility that Israel might legally defend against non-
state actors as long as the legal basis for that action is something other than the U.N. Charter—perhaps 
jus cogens, customary international law, natural law, or general principles of law.  But since Article 51 
speaks to the inherent right of self-defense, a more natural assumption is that the Charter provision on 
the use of defensive force merely incorporates existing international law, in which case O’Connell’s 
position becomes incoherent and the advisory opinion indefensible.   
75 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 160, 199 (Nov. 6) (holding U.S. destruction of 
Iranian platforms neither necessary to defend against any attack or proportionate to the threat of 
imminent attack in the form of further missile launches); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 263 (July 8) (finding the use or threat of nuclear 
weapons exceedingly unlikely to satisfy necessity and proportionality requirements except in extreme 
case where survival of a state or people threatened). 
76 U.N. Charter art 2, para. 4. 
77 The Vandenberg Amendment, attached by the United States Senate as a reservation to the 
Declaration acknowledging the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the I.C.J., precluded the Court 
from taking cases involving the U.S. where legal issues to be decided depended on construction of a 
multi-lateral treaty (including the U.N. Charter) unless all states party to the treaty and affected by the 
case were joined as parties.  Grant Gilmore, The International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L.J. 1049, 
1053 n.13 (1946).  The U.S. argued that its use of force against Nicaragua was justifiable as an exercise 
of collective self-defense on behalf of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.  Memorial of U.S., 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Pleadings 182 
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jurisprudence of self-defense does far more than parse the text of the 
Charter; it draws also on customary international law and general 
principles of law to flush out the elements and contours of the international 
right to legitimate self defense. 
It is precisely these insights from general principles of law and 
customary international law that offer a principled alternative to 
originalism for those seeking to develop the newly acknowledged 
constitutional right to self defense and apply it to pressing contemporary 
problems under municipal law.78  In this light, it is particularly worth 
noting that the legal principle that states have a right to self-defense 
implies that states have a right to be armed.  Indeed Alfred von Verdross, 
the earliest expositor of the foundational principle of modern international 
law that jus cogens rules may not yield to competing rules of lesser 
normative value, used treaties rendering a state unable to defend itself as a 
principal illustrative example of a rule-making forbidden by jus cogens.79  
But to say states may be armed is hardly to say that they have an unlimited 
and immutable right to weaponry.  As the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons reminds us, it has been a 
fundamental principle of Hague law for a century that the capacity to 
inflict suffering on an attacker or the enemy is not unlimited.80  In the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, states consented to the first modern 
arms control limitations, and the global arms control regime now extends 
beyond bans on poison gases and exploding bullets to prohibitions and 
limitations respecting nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical 
weapons, landmines, and cluster munitions.81  To pursue the municipal 
                                                                                                                          
(Nov. 26).  Since the latter three states were not parties to the case, issues under the Charter were not 
opposable against the U.S. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nic. V. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 430 (Nov. 26).  The Court decided the merits based on 
customary international law regarding the use of force, citing the U.N. Charter provisions on the use of 
force as evidence of customary international law.  Id.  The U.S. withdrew its Declaration recognizing 
the compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction of the I.C.J. to highlight its objects to the Court’s decision in the 
jurisdictional phase of the case prior to the decision on the merits.  See id. at 441.  
78 Resort to foreign and international materials in the context of deciding U.S. cases is itself the 
subject of famous controversy among the justices of the Supreme Court.  It is perhaps not surprising 
that those committed to originalism are most hostile to consideration of non-U.S. sources, even for 
purposes of developing general principles of law already inherent in American jurisprudence.   See, 
e.g., Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 3 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 519, 521 (2005). 
79 Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571, 577 
(1937).  Verdross’s path-breaking article has an interesting double-edged quality in that it can be easily 
read to delegitimize both the punitive aspects of the Versailles Treaty and looming Nazi aggression 
against Austria and Czechoslovakia.  
80 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 256–57 
(July 8). 
81 George H. Aldrich & Christina M. Chinkin, Introduction to the Hague Peace Conferences 
Symposium, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2000).  See generally MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 665–740 (2d ed. 2009). 
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analogy back to its foundations, consenting to these limitations reflects in 
real terms the same calculus among states that Hobbes, Locke, and 
Blackstone attribute to individuals at the formation of the social contract: 
that is, a decision to accept binding and enforceable limitations on the 
capacity to use force in order to promote individual and collective security.  
V.  REFLECTIONS ON DRONES AND THE COMMENTS OF  
ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC HOLDER AND PRESIDENT CARTER 
Reflecting on the legality of drone strikes, the most salient question 
currently confronting the United States under the international law of self-
defense, suggests provisional insights that might help us constructively 
rethink debates about the limits of self-defense under American municipal 
law brought to prominence by George Zimmerman’s shooting of Trayvon 
Martin.  Let me begin with some observations concerning the use of drones 
against al-Qaeda operatives. 
The deployment of unmanned drones for purposes (depending on one’s 
perspective) of precise military strikes or targeted assassinations82 has 
generated enormous worldwide controversy during the Obama 
presidency.83  In particular, Attorney General Eric Holder’s defense of 
                                                                                                                          
82 The controversy surrounding targeted assassination in the context of the War on Terror extends 
well beyond issues directly tied to the use of drones.  A new book by a pseudonymous author claiming 
to be a Navy Seal involved in the U.S. military raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan holds out that the object of the mission was assassination, and that there were no plans to 
attempt to arrest or take Bin Laden prisoner.  See MARK OWEN, NO EASY DAY (2012). 
83 Commentary and analysis—whether popular, political, or academic—on drone strikes, and 
more broadly, targeted assassinations, is voluminous.  See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel 53(4) PD 817 (2005) (Isr.); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/l4/Add. 6 (May 
28, 2010); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser to U.S. Dep’t of State, the Obama Administration and 
International Law, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 
(Mar. 25, 2010); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF LETHAL 
FORCE (Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani & Saskia Hufnagel eds., 2012); Gabriella Blum & Philip 
Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 145 (2010); Robert 
Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation 
of Legal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2010); John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, 
Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 PENNUMBRA 175 (2011); David Kretzmer, 
Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Self-
Defence?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2005); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and 
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009); David Cole, Killing Our Citizens 
Without Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/nov
/24/killing-our-citizens-without-trial/?pagination=false; Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, at 34; Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a 
Citizen, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2011, at A6; Editorial, Justifying the Killing of an American, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A22; Editorial, The Power to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at SR10; 
Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether There Is 
‘A Legal Geography of War’ (Apr. 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1824783; David Cole, Killing Citizens in Secret, 
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drone attacks on terrorist targets in his speech on the national security 
policy of the United States delivered at Northwestern University on March 
5, 2012 has provoked heated debate.84  Those whose sense of nationalism 
easily flares into febrile patriotic ire have expressed singular outrage at 
governmental policies targeting U.S. citizens for assassination.  In many 
instances, the underlying intuitive assumption of those offended by the 
Attorney General’s remarks appears to be that good government may do 
what it wishes to others, but it may not kill citizens except by lawful 
execution—by which means it may kill them in abundance.  But less 
jingoistic and violence-prone thinkers have also condemned Holder’s 
remarks,85 and it is likely the national security strategy outlined by the 
Attorney General as much as the long train of abuses at the Guantanamo 
Bay detention camp that sparked President Carter’s New York Times op-
ed condemning the Obama Administration for continuing the dismal 
system of human rights violations first set in motion by a subcabinet 
“torture team” during President George W. Bush’s first term.86 
President Carter is, of course, correct that by the standards of 
international human rights and procedural fairness in criminal prosecution, 
targeted assassination is barbarous and wholly indefensible.  But 
everything depends on the selection of governing paradigm.  Under the law 
of armed conflict, the claim that necessary and proportionate force 
(including lethal force) may be used to prevent an imminent armed attack 
or thwart an ongoing attack by an actor who happens to be a citizen is not 
terribly shocking.87  It is, in fact, an entirely orthodox understanding of the 
jus ad bellum as articulated as long ago as the Caroline Affair.88  
Admittedly, contemporary authorities are split on the legality of 
anticipatory self-defense in the case of an attack that is imminent but not 
yet actual.89  But the trend since 1967, at least among publicists and in-
                                                                                                                          
N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (Oct. 9, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/0
9/killing-citizens-secret/. 
84 See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Mar. 5, 2012, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
85 See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Comment on Eric Holder 
Speech on Targeted Killing Program (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/aclu-comment-eric-holder-speech-targeted-killing-program. 
86 Jimmy Carter, Op-Ed., A Cruel and Unusual Record, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-human-rights-record.html?_r=4.  On 
the Bush-era origins of the policies Carter critiques, see generally PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: 
THE WHISTLE-BLOWING ACCOUNT OF HOW BUSH AND BLAIR ARE TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN 
HANDS (2005) and PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF 
AMERICAN VALUES (2008). 
87 See, e.g., R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 92 (1938).  
88 See James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in 
Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 429, 433–36 (2006). 
89 Compare Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development 
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state practice, has been towards acknowledging the rightfulness of acting 
once an aggressor is poised to launch an imminent strike.90  And for 
present purposes, it is not analytically necessary to premise a coherent 
argument in favor of the use of defensive force against al-Qaeda on the 
imminence of any future attacks, for al-Qaeda openly acknowledges that it 
has attacked the U.S. and that its conflict against the U.S. continues 
unabated.  If a state of armed conflict continues to exist between the U.S. 
and al-Qaeda, then members of al-Qaeda, U.S. nationals included, are 
presumably not civilians but legitimate military targets of the U.S. subject 
to the restrictions imposed by the jus in bello as acknolwedged by Attorney 
General Holder.  In other words, if armed conflict exists, the U.S. may 
target al-Qaeda members whether or not they are attacking or about to 
attack the U.S. or U.S. nationals.91  The presence of armed conflict shifts 
the governing paradigm from jus ad bellum to jus in bello (or international 
humanitarian law), under which U.S. targeting of Al Qaeda operatives 
(including U.S. nationals) is permissible provided it satisfies the 
requirements of (1) military necessity, (2) distinction, (3) proportionality, 
and (4) humanity.92 
That said, several things profoundly disturb me about the Attorney 
General’s comments at Northwestern.  First, there is the assumption that 
the Fifth Amendment applies only or principally to U.S. citizens, which 
makes no sense textually, since the rights it protects are those of 
“persons.”93  If text does not support limiting the Fifth Amendment to 
                                                                                                                          
of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 493, 505–06 (1990), with Timothy Kearley, Raising the 
Caroline, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 344–45 (1999). 
90 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit 
from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 65–66 (2005). 
91 Thanks to Dino Kritsiotis of the University of Nottingham for vetting these ideas with me over 
lunch at the University of South Carolina. 
92 See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 
47 TEX. INT.’L L.J. 75, 83–86 (2001).  Military necessity recognizes the legitimacy of using force to 
achieve submission of the enemy, but not for the purposes of wanton destruction.  Distinction requires 
differentiating between military objects and belligerents who may be targeted, and civilians and civilian 
objects who may not be targeted.  Proportionality prohibits attacks that are likely to cause civilian 
casualties that are excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage sought to be achieved.  
Humanity aims to minimize suffering in armed conflict, and precludes causing suffering unrelated to 
legitimate military purposes. 
93 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Recall also that Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to the warrantless seizure of evidence found in the home of a Mexican 
national in Mexico by U.S. agents, since there is no evidence that the Fourth Amendment was 
understood by its drafters “to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign 
territory.”  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).  This reasoning was rejected 
in vigorous dissents by Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) and Justice Blackmun, who 
maintained that constitutional restraints on the exercise of governmental enforcement powers apply to 
all action by U.S. and state officers anywhere in the world.  Id. at 282.  This universal and non-racist 
approach to judicial enforcement of individual rights echoed Justice Murphy’s classic dissent in In re 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (Murphy J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on the 
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citizens, what does?  Is it suspicion that “Americans” form a master race, 
or that “non-Americans,” in words that might come from Chief Justice 
Taney’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,94 have no rights that the U.S. 
government is bound to respect?  Secondly, I wonder what purpose other 
than pandering to jingoists is served by extraneous invocations of 
originalism.  What the founding fathers thought about the applicability of 
the law of armed conflict to U.S. action against U.S. citizens is not 
obviously relevant, but rather more obviously something about which 
Holder does not know very much.  Finally, there is (especially towards the 
end of his remarks) a nod to American exceptionalism,95 which likewise 
serves no legally analytic purpose, and which I am also inclined to write 
off as pandering.  But I will say this: In accepting the binding and 
outcome-determinative character of international law, Holder has conceded 
much more than his predecessors in the Bush administration would have 
been likely to do and, on that score at least, the speech represents a 
salubrious development.96  Still, as George Fletcher pointed out a decade 
ago in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. 
government’s blending of the law enforcement and armed conflict legal 
regimes not only leads to analytically unclear thinking, but easily promotes 
miscarriages of justice and warping of norms that may have pernicious 
consequences in other contexts as well.97  One could say much the same 
about the government’s assumption that there is a watered-down version of 
the Constitution that applies in wartime or with respect to U.S. 
governmental action against non-citizens.  This is not the written 
Constitution with which I am familiar.  It is, to draw on Justice Jackson’s 
                                                                                                                          
Fourth Amendment’s textual linkage to “people” suggests that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
rights of persons may apply globally against abuse by U.S. and state governmental actors, while the 
Second Amendment guarantee, like the Fourth, applies only in favor of “the people” of the United 
States.  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 267.  But see id. at 264 (distinguishing the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments).  This line of reasoning leads to incongruous consequences respecting the constitutional 
right to arms, which under Verdugo-Urquidez could protect non-U.S. nationals against abuse by state 
governmental actors since by the terms of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment it is 
incorporated in favor of any “person,” but leaves non-U.S. citizens unprotected from abuse by federal 
actors, since the Second Amendment right applies directly in favor of “the people.” 
94 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
95 See Holder, supra note 84.  
96 Consider by way of contrast the stance of John R. Bolton, United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations from 2005 to 2006, whose open hostility to international law was so severe that he 
routinely placed the phrase itself in quotation marks to signify his contempt.  See, e.g., John R. Bolton, 
Clinton Meets “International Law” in Kosovo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999 at 14.  Coincidentally, many 
internationalists look forward to the day Bolton meets “international criminal law” in the Hague.    
97 See, e.g., Karen Greenberg, Heightened Insecurity, 2 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SEC. 1, 1 (2004).  In 
particular, note the ongoing debate between Professor Fletcher and Professor Ruth Wedgwood of Johns 
Hopkins University on the legality of the U.S. war against Iraq and the importance of clear analytic 
distinction between the war and criminal justice paradigms in assessing the legality of various measures 
in the so-called War on Terror.  Id. at 8–16.  
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cautionary admonitions in his dissent in Korematsu, a shadow constitution 
that paves the way for executive primacy that, left unchecked, will grow 
into tyranny.98  The abusive powers that kindly governmental actors wield 
against bad people today will form precedents for less kindly governmental 
actors to employ against less bad (and less foreign) persons tomorrow.99 
VI.  REFLECTIONS ON THE TRAYVON MARTIN  
CASE AND THE BARBARISM OF SEA SLUGS 
Populists on the political right bewail the government’s targeted 
assassination of U.S. citizens.  It does not seem to matter to them, that 
under the law of war, the lethal application of government force to an al-
Qaeda fighter of U.S. nationality is analytically indistinguishable from 
Union targeting of Confederate forces during the Civil War.  Or, less 
charitably, it is perhaps the very applicability of that analogy that saps 
government action of legitimacy in the eyes of some radical antinomian 
populists.  For some, with the possible exception of the New Deal, there is 
no clearer, more paradigmatic case of the federal government going too far 
than its forceful suppression of the Southern rebellion during the American 
Civil War between April 1861 and May 1865.100  Perhaps I should not use 
the phrase “going too far.”  There is an ascendant strain in American 
libertarian thought that would hold any governmental action illegitimate 
precisely because it is governmental in character.  
But populists lament not only the government’s application of force.  
They seem to resent even more the government’s interference with private 
applications of force.  Enter George Zimmerman or, more to the point, 
many of his defenders and the champions of “Stand Your Ground” laws 
and citizen arrest statutes.  Max Weber’s famous aphorism that the 
government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force101 may not 
command majority assent in contemporary America.  Stand Your Ground 
laws, citizen-arrest statutes, and the evisceration of the common law rule 
that the exercise of lawful self-defense requires the actor to retreat to a wall 
or ditch bespeak an antinomian reversion to first principles and a severe 
                                                                                                                          
98 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
99 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 632 (1952) (Douglas, J. concurring). 
100 For more discussion, see TONY HORWITZ, CONFEDERATES IN THE ATTIC: DISPATCHES FROM 
THE UNFINISHED CIVIL WAR (1999), a perhaps far too sympathetic memoir of a well-known 
journalist’s year-long journey among the unreconstructed, and Daniel Feller, Libertarians in the Attic, 
or a Tale of Two Narratives, 32 REV. AM. HIST. 184, 184 (2004), reviewing pseudo-historical and 
propagandistic neo-Confederate writings. 
101 Max Weber, Politics as Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. H. Gerth 
& C. Wright Mills eds., Wrights Mills trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946), available at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf.  In Weber’s words: “Today, however, we 
have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory.”  Id. 
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fraying of the social fabric.  It is one thing to acknowledge that the police 
cannot be everywhere to defend the populace and that it might not be 
desirable to live in a state where government agents are sufficiently 
numerous and officious to be just about everywhere to respond in case of 
emergency, real or contrived.  This suggests private self-defense as a 
fallback option.  It is another to prefer the state of nature as a matter of 
course and private self-defense as the governing paradigm of human 
relations.102  To return to the analogy between municipal and international 
law, the question is whether Article 51 presents an exception to Article 
2(4) or whether it swallows Article 2(4) and the international order of 
which it is a principal bulwark whole. 
The vigilante figures prominently in popular fantasy, and, perhaps, 
though the facts in the public sphere are very murky indeed, in George 
Zimmerman’s fantastical self-image.103  Deciphering the complex events 
leading to the death of Trayvon Martin requires hard work and measured 
judgment.  So does sorting through the Florida Stand Your Ground Law 
and the small number of Florida Supreme Court cases offering guidance as 
to its meaning, and the perhaps conflicting commands of Florida’s 
generally applicable self-defense statute partially supplanted by the Stand 
Your Ground Law.104  Read together, the statutes and the limited body of 
related Florida Supreme Court case law establish an incompletely 
theorized set of rules respecting partial and conditional forfeiture of the 
                                                                                                                          
102 In extremis, this world is quite literally barbarous, or even subhuman.  An analogy from 
discourse concerning the law of nations is instructive.  Consider the noted literary critic Edmund 
Wilson’s musings on resort to armed conflict absent a coherent jus ad bellum: “In a recent . . . film 
showing life at the bottom of the sea, a primitive organism called a sea slug is seen gobbling up small 
organisms through a large orifice at the end of its body; confronted with another sea slug of an only 
slightly lesser size, it ingurgitates that, too.  Now the wars fought by human beings are stimulated as a 
rule . . . by the same instincts as the voracity of the sea slug.”  MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST 
WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 60 (4th ed. 2006).   
103 In a different factual and statutory context, an eerily similar case captured the nation’s 
attention in the 1980s when “subway vigilante” Bernhard Goetz acted in anticipation of an expected 
attack and shot four youths who he believed appeared menacing.  Joseph A. Kirby, ‘Subway Vigilante’ 
Case in Final Stage, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1996, at 4.  Like the shooting of Trayvon Martin, the 
Bernhard Goetz case was racially inflected on the ground, in the media, and in the popular imagination.  
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 
(1988).  
104 The “Stand Your Ground Law,” FLA. STAT. 776.013(3), states: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any 
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right 
to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or 
she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm 
to himself or herself.  
Id.  FLA. STAT. 776.041(2) provides “The justification [of self-defense] is not available to a person who 
. . . initially provokes the use of force against himself or herself.”  Id.  
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right to self-defense by initial aggressors.105  While parts of the Florida 
Code originate in the Model Penal Code, Florida criminal law in its current 
state is not theoretically coherent in the continental European sense, with a 
General Part and a Special Part, few inconsistencies, and overarching 
conceptual purposes.  The Stand Your Ground Law is one of many 
appendages cobbled onto a doctrinal body that consists to a significant 
degree of accretions, relics, exceptions, vestiges, and sops to animated 
constituencies. 
I do not mean to disparage lawmaking by democratic means, or even to 
suggest that law in the United States is deficient in that statutes and codes 
originate in legislative committees and in the work of lobbyists rather than 
in the work of academic philosophers appointed by Napoleon or Bismarck.  
Indeed, I argue that a heightened burden rests on courts to explain with 
particular cogency the theoretical basis for decisions that unsettle policies 
codified into law by democratically accountable agents.  But in the U.S., 
high courts and high court judges have never shied away from 
                                                                                                                          
105 The theoretical importance of distinguishing between claims to exercise defensive force 
asserted by someone defending the status quo, on the one hand, and an initial aggressor who has 
unsettled a previously existing state of affairs, on the other, is famously associated with Immanuel 
Kant’s analysis of the case of a shipwrecked sailor attempting to dislodge another sailor from a floating 
plank that will support only one man.  FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, 
at 49–55.  By contrast to the muddled state of affairs under Florida law, consider the more highly 
theorized account in the German Federal Court’s (BGH) appellate decision of November 22, 2000—3 
StR 331/00 reported in Juristenzeitung 2001, 664, with accompanying commentary by Professor Claus 
Roxin [hereinafter Roxin decision] (Author’s translation on file and available for consultation).  The 
case involves the question of whether lethal force was justifiable self-defense in the case of a would-be 
assailant who found the tables turned against him.  The initial aggressor, intending revenge for injuries 
suffered in an earlier incident, arranged an illegal cigarette smuggling deal with the eventual victim as a 
pretext for luring him into a forest so that he could be shot.  When the eventual victim realized that the 
initial aggressor intended to assault him, the victim struck the aggressor with a club before the 
aggressor had a chance to pull out his weapon.  At this point, the victim formed the resolution to kill 
the aggressor by means of a further club strike.  The aggressor defended himself by discharging a lethal 
double-barreled shotgun blast into the victim.  Thus, the aggressor entered the stage intending criminal 
assault.  He ultimately acted with defensive force.  The Appellate Court ruled that on these facts, the 
aggressor was guilty of criminally negligent homicide, because he could have foreseen that the use of 
deadly force might become necessary to defend his own life as a result of his contemplated assault.  
Professor Roxin disagreed, reasoning that  
a provocateur surprised by a life-threatening attack should not be left defenseless.  In 
the first place, the interests of the attacked person take precedence, as his life must 
be valued more highly than the readily understandable desire for retaliation on the 
part of the attacker.  Secondly, if the State did not offer adequate protection against 
private acts of revenge, if would foster lynch law, which runs counter to the 
purposes of the criminal law.  Admittedly, in cases of severe provocation, every 
other means to extricate oneself from the attack without injury, including even 
acceptance of definable risks, must be ruled out [before the resort to deadly force is 
justified.] 
Roxin decision, supra.  Professor Roxin would have acquitted on homicide and convicted for attempted 
grievous bodily harm. 
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jurisprudential reflection.  Even Oliver Wendell Holmes’s aphorism that 
the life of the common law is not reason but experience reflects a high 
level of theoretical abstraction and a detached, studied, systematic, 
perspective.106  In that spirit, the Supreme Court of the United States might 
have done better than recognize a constitutional right to self-defense based 
on historical fantasy.  And the Supreme Court of Florida, when it reviews 
the Stand Your Ground Law, would be well served to avoid consulting 
Anglo-Floridian origin myths embodied in the aggressively genocidal 
ghosts of General Andrew Jackson and Colonel William Worth about the 
scope of legitimate self-defense.107  It appears to me far more cogent to 
reflect, once facts are settled to the degree that the evidence admits, on 
whether George Zimmerman acted preemptively, in anticipatory self-
defense, or in actual self-defense, and whether his conduct and relevant 
provisions of the Florida Code are consistent with coherent criteria for 
delimiting the boundary between impermissible preemptive assassination 
and permissible, necessary, proportionate self-defense against an actual (or 
imminent?) attack.  These inquiries are not the stuff of originalism, but of 
general principles of law gleaned from comparative study and analytic 
reflection. 
VII.  THE WAY FORWARD 
Admittedly, to a hardheaded observer, there may seem little realistic 
chance that the Supreme Court of the United States or a high court in one 
of the several states stands poised to cast off parochial reflections on 
allegedly exceptional American origins in favor of investigations into 
transnational principles of justice any time soon.  In the context of the 
politically-freighted issues of self-defense, gun control, and individual 
reliance on a Weberian public order, there is every reason to expect 
American jurists—who seldom swing too far from popular opinion—will 
remain beholden to popular beliefs in American exceptionalism and the 
continuing allure of foundation mythology.  After all, when Justices Breyer 
and Scalia meet on the lecture circuit to rejoin the debate over the 
legitimacy of judicial consultation of foreign and international sources, 
even Justice Breyer suggests only occasional and modest borrowings from 
                                                                                                                          
106 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
107 Jackson, rightly or wrongly, is widely “credited” with originating the genocidal observation 
that “the only good Indian is a dead Indian.”  As a rogue General, he conquered Spanish Florida and 
offered it to the United States for annexation; as President, his signature helped make the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830 law.  Worth pursued liquidation policies during the Seminole War that “pacified” 
peninsular Florida and opened it to Anglo-American settlement.  See BEN KIERNAN, BLOOD AND SOIL: 
A WORLD HISTORY OF GENOCIDE AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 300–34 (2007); 
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 137–38, 162–63 (1984).    
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persuasive but not binding transnational sources.108  In the sober words of 
Jeremy Waldron, “We do not live in an age in which uttering magic words 
like ‘ius gentium’ is sufficient to license the practice of basing American 
legal conclusions on non-American legal premises.”109  And yet, on closer 
reflection, it may be that this most charged of political arenas, pitting the 
antinomian and anarchic champions of an unbridled right to armed self-
defense against the statist rear guard urging measured restrictions on resort 
to force and access to arms, is the ideal forum in which to push serious 
judicial forays towards internationally inflected principles-based analysis 
of conflicts and claims.   
I suggest two reasons for this counterintuitive nod in an optimistic 
direction.  First—and this has the principal focus of my previous writing 
on the Second Amendment—the originalist account of the right to armed 
self-defense is objectively absurd and facially dishonest.  If the Miltonian, 
Jeffersonian, Madisonian, Holmesian, and Brandeisian faith in the 
marketplace of ideas has any substance at all, in the long run, the 
originalist celebration of the cult of guns and violence will collapse under 
its own weight.  Second, there is a highly coherent and jurisprudentially 
sound theory readily available to take its place.  That theory is the analytic 
jurisprudence of self-defense founded in comparative study, cogently 
expounded in the works of George Fletcher, for current purposes most 
saliently in The Grammar of Criminal Law, which upon completion will 
run to three volumes covering American, Comparative, and International 
Criminal Law.110  
My Second Amendment work to this point reflects my efforts to 
contribute to the first phase of a three stage process aimed at dismantling 
the originalist jurisprudence of the right to self-defense and replacing it 
with something better.  The “something better” is already extant, and might 
be called the “Fletcher School,” founded on general principles of the law 
of self-defense.  The criminal theorists and comparativists working on 
elaborating these general principles of criminal law are in the process of 
completing the second phase of the process I envision.  My future work in 
this field will focus on the third stage in the process, namely attempting to 
import insights from general principles of law into the American 
jurisprudence of armed self-defense with a view to supplanting the now-
ascendant but untenable originalist approach.  In the federal courts, 
windows into this general principles-based discourse might open via 
substantive due process, privileges and immunities, the Ninth Amendment, 
emanations from specific provisions of the Bill of Rights (including the 
                                                                                                                          
108 See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 78, at 524. 
109 Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 143 
(2005). 
110 FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 69, at vii–xxi. 
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Second Amendment itself), or frank invocation of natural law.  My task 
going forward will be to help make the case that these pathways are more 
legitimate than the originalist course I urge forsaking.  An enormous 
challenge lies ahead for those intending, as I do, to make the affirmative 
case for opening doors long closed, shuttered, and posted with labels 
warning that entry leads to values-inflected judging and to substitution of 
judicial will for legislative preferences.  But honest confrontation of the 
jurisprudential substance underlying the debates on the legitimate use of 
guns ultimately involves the general principles of law, not historical 
fantasies about settlers and bears or historical realities about civic 
republican fondness for the militia and distrust of the Army. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Johnson’s well-reasoned argument that it is both bad policy 
and gravely unjust to deny law-abiding and civic-minded members of the 
Black community the right to own weapons for self-defense against violent 
criminals that the police and courts control only imperfectly, if at all, 
merits serious consideration.  I suspect that the right to which Professor 
Johnson refers also merits constitutional enforcement.  That said, the right 
to self-defense that Professor Johnson references has very little to do with 
the original public understanding of the Second Amendment.  To me, that 
should not matter.  The five Justices who joined the Heller and McDonald 
majorities acted in an unprincipled and results-oriented fashion to model an 
intellectually untenable right to self-defense that depends far too heavily on 
made-up history.  These five Justices, their colleagues on the bench, and 
constitutionally engaged citizens might do well to reflect on Professor 
Johnson’s narrative, and attempt to root the unwritten right to self-defense 
that he adumbrates in the American constitutional fabric by some more 
honest means than puerile fantasies and fetishes about half-imagined 
ancestors.  Principled engagement with the criminal theory of self-defense 
and our long jurisprudential history of enforcement of non-enumerated and 
textually unspecified rights through substantive due process strike me as 
salubrious starting points on the road to constitutional honesty.  Poignant 
reflection on the Black experience as a painfully real alternative to an 
imagined glorious founding will play an indispensable part in any serious 
effort to construct an intellectually honest constitutional right to self-
defense. 
